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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Donald

J.

Jay appeals from the

district court’s

order denying his motion to suppress

evidence discovered as a result 0f a trafﬁc infraction stop.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

The magistrate court

set forth the

underlying facts 0f this case as follows:

On January 3, 2018, Trooper Rodean 0f the Idaho State Police was on duty
and traveling westbound 0n 1-84 in Elmore County, Idaho. At 9:20 AM, near mile
marker 98, he observed a White SUV Chevrolet parked off t0 the right-side of the
freeway, on the shoulder. He noticed that the vehicle was parked half—way on the
paved portion of the shoulder, and half—way onto the gravel. Trooper Rodean
moved his cruiser t0 the right and parked behind the vehicle. He did not turn 0n
his overhead lights, and only activated his rear lights. There was trafﬁc 0n the
freeway, and the noise from the cars passing by typically makes it difﬁcult to hear.
After he stopped, Trooper Rodean called in his location to dispatch and then
approached the driver’s side door Where he observed the Defendant in the driver’s
seat, slumped back, apparently sleeping. The car was off, and the hazard lights
were not ﬂashing. Trooper Rodean knocked 0n the window, and did not receive an
immediate response. He waited for approximately three t0 ﬁve seconds, and then
opened the driver’s side door. The noise made the Defendant “come to,” and the
Defendant was initially incoherent. He told the Defendant that he was checking on
him and informed him that he could not be parked on the interstate. The defendant
did not respond. Rodean asked t0 see the Defendant’s driver’s license and

identiﬁcation.

The Defendant responded that he did not have a driver’s license and that he
did not have any identiﬁcation with him. The Defendant told Trooper Rodean that
his name was “Darren” and that his date 0f birth was January 7, 1978. Trooper
Rodean went back to his patrol vehicle and ran the information he had been given
by the defendant, which returned as non-found. Trooper Rodean went back to the
Defendant Who clariﬁed the spelling 0f his name and Rodean re-ran the
information, Which again came back as no-return/non-found.
While trying to run the information a second time, Trooper Rodean
observed the Defendant from his patrol vehicle leaning into the passenger side, so
he made contact with the Defendant again. At that time, Trooper Rodean informed
the Defendant that he was being detained and asked him t0 step out 0f the vehicle.
He placed the Defendant in handcuffs and put him in the back 0f his patrol vehicle.

He placed the Defendant in handcuffs and put him in the back of his patrol vehicle.
He then ran the vehicle information, which returned to a different person. Trooper
Rodean began
stolen.

When

investigating t0 determine whether or not the car

asked, the Defendant stated that

Who had let him borrow

it

belonged

rights.

t0 a friend (his cousin),

it.

Trooper Rodean placed the Defendant under

Miranda

had been reported

arrest

and advised him 0f his
arrest, and located

Trooper Rodean conducted a search incident to

which contained the Defendant’s Idaho
Rodean with the Defendant’s true name
and true date of birth. After running the correct information, Trooper Rodean
discovered that the Defendant was wanted 0n a Felony warrant. Prior to towing the
vehicle, the ofﬁcers conducted an inventory search 0fthe vehicle, where they found
the Defendant’s wallet in his pants pocket,

identiﬁcation card. This provided Trooper

drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp.68-70.)

The
(2) driving

motion

state

charged Jay with (1) providing false information t0 a law enforcement ofﬁcer,

without privileges, and (3) possession of drug paraphernalia.

to suppress “evidence

reasonable suspicion and that

on the basis

[his]

vehicle

that [he]

(R., p.8.)

Jay ﬁled a

was detained by law enforcement without

was searched Without probable cause.”

(R., pp.17-18.)

After the submission of briefs (see R., pp.19-34, 40-48, 53-59) and a hearing 0n the motion

(ﬂ

generally 4/18/18 TL), the magistrate court denied Jay’s suppression motion (R., pp.68-74).

The

court held that, because the ofﬁcer had probable cause t0 detain or seize Jay t0 investigate a
Violation of LC. § 49-660(1)(a)(9) (illegally parking

0n a controlled-access highway), and because

Jay was non-responsive t0 the ofﬁcer’s attempts to awaken him, the ofﬁcer had the right to open
the car door,

totality

which “was not unreasonable and was a minimal intrusion by

0f the circumstances.”

theories of the

(R., p.72.)

The court added that

community care taking function or the

it

[the ofﬁcer]

given the

“does not analyze the alternative

doctrine of inevitable discovery.” (R., p.73.)

Pursuant t0 a plea agreement, Jay entered conditional pleas 0f guilt to providing false
information to a law enforcement ofﬁcer and driving Without privileges, and the state dismissed

the paraphernalia charge.

(R., pp.79-87;

see generally 6/1 1/18 Tr.) Jay ﬁled a timely notice of

appeal t0 the district court. (R., pp.88-93.)
After brieﬁng (R., pp. 100-124, 13 1-144, 147-15 1) and oral argument (see generally
4/22/ 19 TL), the district court

made

a verbal ruling afﬁrming the magistrate court’s denial 0f Jay’s

suppression motion, not only 0n the “probable cause” ground relied upon by the magistrate court,
but also as a legitimate “community caretaking” function of law enforcement (see generally

4/22/19

Tr., p.21,

L.20 — p.26, L22).

Jay ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal.

(R.,

pp.158-161.)

ISSUES
Jay states the issues 0n appeal
1.

as:

Did the District Court err with
Jay’s Motion to Suppress?

2.

Should
Court’s

this

it

afﬁrmed the

Trial Court’s

Memo Denying Mr.

Court reverse the District Court’s oral order afﬁrming the Trial

Memo

Denying Motion

to Suppress,

based 0n the Idaho Supreme

Court’s holding in State V. Clarke?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Did the
suppress?

district court err

by afﬁrming

the magistrate’s order denying Jay’s motion t0

ARGUMENT
The
A.

District

Court Did Not Err

BV Denying Jay’s Motion To

Suppress

Introduction

Jay argues, “based 0n United States

v.

Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) and Florida

v.

Jardines,

133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013), that law enforcement conducted a warrantless search of [his] vehicle

law enforcement opened the door of a vehicle
Jay speciﬁcally contends the search
elected to not seize

him

(i.e.,

in

Which

(Ct.

App. 2006),

for illegally parking

(2) the

and vehicle

after

on a controlled access highway (see LC.

by

State V. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 137 P.3d

“community caretaker” function 0f a law enforcement ofﬁcer does
165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d 451 (2019), “the evidence that

[his] guilty

pleas were [sic] obtained during the search of [his] person

fail.

As

the district court opined, Trooper

investigation of Jay’s illegally parking

on the freeway;

Rodean did not abandon

therefore, the

assertion that the ofﬁcer unlawfully searched his vehicle

by opening

Jay’s non-responsiveness to Trooper Rodean’s attempts t0

car,

§ 49-

(Id.)

Jay’s arguments

of the

because (1) the ofﬁcer

an arrest for a competed misdemeanor offense that did not occur in the presence

0f law enforcement.”

seat

illegal

1 .)

V. Clarke,

not apply, and (3) under State

provided the factual basis for

sitting.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.

opening the car door) was

660(1)(a)(9), therefore the search cannot be justiﬁed

1024

was

[he]

when

m

decision dispels Jay’s

the car door.

awaken him

his

Next, due to

as he sat in the driver’s

coupled With the dangerous position 0f the car on the shoulder of Interstate 84, the

ofﬁcer’s actions were justiﬁed as a legitimate

community caretaking

did not challenge the validity of his arrest below
failed to preserve

any challenge

t0 his arrest

— only the

initial

was

Last, because Jay

opening 0f the car door — he has

based 0n the recent

considered, the arrest 0f Jay for driving without privileges

function.

M

decision.

Even

if

valid under LC. § 49-1407(1)

because Jay did not “furnish satisfactory evidence of identity” and the ofﬁcer had “reasonable and
probable grounds to believe [Jay would] disregard a written promise t0 appear in court.1

Standard

B.

Of Review

On review

0f a decision rendered by a

district court in its intermediate appellate capacity,

the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.” State V. DeWitt, 145 Idaho

709, 71

1,

184 P.3d 215, 217

758 (2005)).
substantial

The

(Ct.

App. 2008)

(citing

Losser

V. Bradstreet,

145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d

appellate court “reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there

and competent evidence

to support the magistrate’s

is

ﬁndings of fact and whether the

magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.” State V. Tregeagle, 161 Idaho 763,

765, 391 P.3d 21, 23 (Ct. App. 2017).

Whether the

district court erred is

based on whether the

magistrate’s ﬁndings are supported and the magistrate’s legal conclusions follow therefrom.

Lettit, 162 Idaho 849, 851, 406 P.3d 370, 372

(Ct.

m

App. 2017).

“The standard ofreview 0f a suppression motion is bifurcated.”

State V. Mullins, 164 Idaho

493, 496, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018) (quoting State V. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135

(2005)).

“When a decision 0n a motion t0

ﬁndings of

fact that are supported

by

suppress

is

challenged, the Court accepts the

court’s

substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of

constitutional principles t0 the facts as found.” Li. (quoting State V.

15,

trial

McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 414-

398 P.3d 146, 147-48 (2017)).

1

should be recalled that Jay was arrested for driving Without privileges because he gave the
ofﬁcer a false name. (4/18/18 Tr., p.33, L.2 — p.36, L.8.) The arrest led to Trooper Rodean’s
It

discovery 0f Jay’s wallet 0n his person and his true identity, Which, in turn, resulted in the
discovery that Jay had an outstanding felony arrest warrant. (4/18/18
6

T11, p.34,

L.14 — p.36, L8.)

Under

C.

Irwin,

It

Was

Legal For The Ofﬁcer T0 Open The Car Door

As

Part

Of A Trafﬁc

Infraction Detention

Both the magistrate court and the

district court

concluded that Trooper Rodean’s act 0f

opening the driver’s side door of the car parked 0n Interstate 84, upon ﬁnding Jay slumped

and non-responsive
1024

(Ct.

In

in the driver’s seat,

App. 2006). (See

m, two

was

legal

under State

R., p.72; 4/22/19 Tr., p.26, L.23

V. Irwin,

— p.29,

down

143 Idaho 102, 137 P.3d

L.5.)

Both courts are

police ofﬁcers observed a vehicle traveling at night With

correct.

headlights off

its

and passenger door open When the “vehicle slowed and the passenger exited the still-moving
vehicle in the middle 0f the roadway.” Li, 143 Idaho at 103, 137 P.3d at 1025.

momentarily

t0 talk t0 the passenger,

who

said that he exited the car due t0 an argument with his

girlfriend (the driver), the ofﬁcers continued their pursuit

Li, 143 Idaho at 103, 137 P.3d
front seats,

at

1025.

After stopping

of the car and found

The ofﬁcers saw Irwin curled up 0n

it

lawfully parked.

the

ﬂoor behind the

and one of them opened the passenger side door and ordered Irwin to get

being charged With DUI, Irwin

moved

t0 suppress all the evidence obtained,

out.

I_d.

After

and also challenged

the validity of her administrative license suspension (for refusing to take a breath test), claiming

her civil rights were violated

137 P.3d

at

The

When

the ofﬁcers opened the car door.

Li, 143 Idaho at 103-104,

1025-1026.

m

decision reviewed the legal landscape generally applicable t0 the ﬁrst-

impression issue of Whether

“it

constituted an impermissible search for the ofﬁcer t0

Without ﬁrst orally ordering her out of the vehicle and giving her the opportunity to
her

own voliti0n[,]”

open a door

come

explaining:

Routine trafﬁc stops for investigation 0f possible trafﬁc Violations or other crimes

well-known standards for investigative detentions set forth in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See Prouse, 440
U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Thus, an ofﬁcer may stop a vehicle and question its
are governed

occupants

by

if the

the

ofﬁcer has reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity, including

out 0n

suspicion that the vehicle
S.Ct. 1391; State

being operated contrary to trafﬁc laws.

is

Id. at 661,

99

Patterson, 140 Idaho 612, 614, 97 P.3d 479, 481 (Ct.App.2004).

v.

The United States Supreme Court has further held that once an ofﬁcer has lawfully
stopped a motor vehicle for a trafﬁc Violation, ordering the driver to get out of the
vehicle does not offend the Fourth Amendment. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 111 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).

Li, 143 Idaho at 104-105, 137 P.3d

at

1026-1027.

After surveying decisions from several other jurisdictions, none of Which held “that a

Fourth

Amendment

Violation occurred because an ofﬁcer opened a vehicle door before directing

an occupant t0 come out[,]”

Given

Q,

143 Idaho

at 105,

137 P.3d

at

1027, the Irwin decision concluded:

have clear authority t0 order people out of vehicles during a
roadside stop, it is constitutionally irrelevant Whether the ofﬁcer 0r the occupant
opens the car door to enable the occupant t0 exit. Accordingly, the district court
erred in holding that the ofﬁcer’s act of opening the door of Irwin’s vehicle was an
that ofﬁcers

unconstitutional search.

143 Idaho

137 P.3d

at 106,

at

1028.

Applying Irwin here, because Trooper Rodean had reasonable suspicion to believe

had committed a trafﬁc Violation —
§

49-660(1)(a)(9)

—

illegally

that Jay

parking 0n a controlled access highway under LC.

his act 0f opening the

door 0f the car in Which Jay

sat

was not an

unconstitutional search.

T0 avoid

the holding in Irwin, Jay argues (1) because the magistrate court did not take

judicial notice of the fact that Interstate 84 is a “controlled access

highway” under the LC.

660(1)(a)(9) and LC. § 49-109(5)(b) (deﬁning “controlled-access”), there
for the court t0

2

ﬁnd

that a trafﬁc infraction

Although not speciﬁcally

stated,

m

occurred} and

Jay appears t0 contend

a controlled-access highway, the state failed to
therefore, the rationale of

a routine trafﬁc Violation

— that

— would not

it is

legal for

show

(2)

that,

was no

49-

evidentiary basis

because Trooper Rodean did not

Without proof that Interstate 84

a Violation 0f LC. §

is

19-660(1)(a)(9);

an ofﬁcer t0 open a car door during a stop for

apply. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-13.)
8

§

seize Jay before he

State

v.

Irwin

.

.

.

is

opened the car door, “both the

District Court’s

and Trial Court’s reliance on

ﬂawed because the Irwin Court held that a law enforcement

a car door during a constitutionally sound seizure.”

[ofﬁcer] can

open

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-19 (emphasis

added).)

1.

There
Is

Was

Substantial Evidence

Showing Reasonable Suspicion That

Interstate

84

A Controlled-Access Highway Under Idaho Code S 49-660( 1)(a)(9)

In regard to Whether Interstate 84

is

a controlled-access highway, the magistrate’s written

decision stated:

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 49-109(5)(b), Interstate 84 is a controlled access highway,
t0 Which Idaho Code § 49-660(1)(a)(9) applies. Thus, When the Defendant stopped
0n the shoulder of the freeway t0 rest, he was in Violation § 49-660(1)(a)(9). The
court further notes that none of the exceptions to § 49-660(1)(a)(9) apply to the
Defendant’s conduct in this case and that the Defendant merely pulled over to rest,
in his vehicle, alongside the freeway.

(R., p.71.)

On appeal,

the district court explained in

its

oral ruling:

However, the Court ﬁnds the magistrate judge, without taking
notice, did note that Interstate 84

is

a controlled-access highway.

And

judicial

Idaho Code

49-660(1)(a)9 applies and therefore the defendant’s conduct 0f merely parking the
is a Violation 0f Idaho Code 49-

vehicle on the shoulder, partway off the shoulder,
660(1)(a)9.
it’s

So the Court analyzed, Without speciﬁcally taking judicial

obvious from the evidence submitted that the ofﬁcer was 0n I84

And

notice, but

when he

calls

was it challenged at the motion to
was any competent — nor was any competent evidence
presented that this was not a controlled-access highway when the car was parked
0n the shoulder of 184. So the Court ﬁnds that factual ﬁnding by the magistrate is
into dispatch.

it is

really undisputed nor

suppress hearing that there

not clearly erroneous.
(4/22/19 Tr., p.19, L.19

—

p.20, L.1

1.)

Although the magistrate court did not take judicial notice 0f the

fact that Interstate

84

is

a

controlled-access highway, Trooper Rodean’s testimony provided substantial evidence for such a

ﬁnding. Idaho Code § 49-660(1)(a)(9) reads:
(1)

Except when necessary t0 avoid conﬂict with other trafﬁc, in compliance With
law, the directions of a peace ofﬁcer 0r trafﬁc control device, n0 person shall:

Stop, stand 0r park a vehicle:

(a)

9.

On any controlled-access highway;

Trooper Rodean testiﬁed that when he ﬁrst engaged Jay in a conversation, he told Jay that he

on the

“[c]an’t be parked here

The Trooper

(4/18/18 T11, p.17, Ls.20-21.)

interstate.”

later

testiﬁed:

It is

someone

be parked on the interstate, especially with no
But it was just, kind of, the letting him know, you
reason why I am stopping now with the vehicle is because it is

just unusual for

hazards 0n. The engine was

to

off.

know, the initial
parked 0n the interstate.
Q.

And is

it

your understanding 0f[sic] the law

in

Idaho prohibits parking 0n the

interstate?

A.

It

does.

Q. With certain exceptions?

A. Certain exceptions, yes.
(4/18/18 Tr., p.26, Ls.9-19 (emphasis added).)

By

testifying that

it

was

illegal for

certain exceptions t0 that rule, Trooper

Which

is

Jay t0 be parked on the

Rodean was

interstate,

and

that there are

clearly referring to I.C. § 49-660(1)(a)(9),

the only one 0f I.C. § 49-660(1)(a)’s ten sub-sections that can possibly apply to Jay’s

parking of the car on Interstate 84, and which includes several exceptions t0 the

Trooper Rodean testiﬁed
car illegally

that,

under

I.C. I.C. § 49-660(1)(a)(9),

that Interstate

controlled-access highway. Therefore, there

was

court t0 support the ﬁnding that Trooper

Rodean reasonably suspected

highway under

In effect,

he suspected Jay had parked the

0n the highway, Which necessarily included the assertion

controlled-access

rule.

84

is

a

substantial evidence presented t0 the magistrate

I.C. § 49-660(1)(a)(9).

10

Interstate

84 was a

Trooper Rodean Did Not Abandon His

2.

Reasons For Stopping To Investigate

Initial

Although Trooper Rodean did not turn 0n the overhead
stop t0 investigate for

illegal

parking

two reasons:

may have

(1) Jay’s car

car

illegally

of his patrol vehicle, he did

on

and

Interstate 84,

(2) the

reﬂected either a physical problem for the driver, or a mechanical

problem With the vehicle. (See 4/1 8/1 8

by knocking 0n his

was parked

lights

Window two

T11, p.13,

L.10 — p.17, L21.)

failing t0

Rodean turned his

separate times, Trooper

—

out if Jay had a physical problem. (4/18/18 Tr., p.14, L.25

mean that the Trooper abandoned his

Upon

p.16, L.7.)

awaken Jay

attention to

However,

ﬁnding

that does not

investigation into the trafﬁc Violation. Trooper

Rodean was

keenly aware of the trafﬁc Violation throughout his contact With Jay, testifying that after he opened
the car door the trafﬁc noise “kind of had [Jay]

parked here 0n the

interstate.” (4/ 1 8/ 1 8 Tr., p.

1

come
7, Ls.

to,”

and he informed Jay that he “[c]an’t be

14-2 1 .)

When the ofﬁcer was asked whether

he had been able t0 resolve his concern regarding Jay’s wellbeing once Jay began t0 respond, he
testiﬁed:

Not yet. I wanted t0 get his story and see What was going 0n. It is just unusual for
someone t0 be parked on the interstate, especially with no hazards 0n. The engine
was off. But it was just, kind of, the letting him know, you know, the initial reason
why I am stopping now with the vehicle is because it is parked 0n the interstate.
(4/18/18 Tr., p.26, Ls.8-14 (emphasis added).)

§ 49-660(1)(a)(9),

As

Trooper Rodean acknowledged

“the law in Idaho prohibits parking

on the

previously noted, in obvious reference t0 LC.

that,

although there are “[c]ertain exceptions,”

interstate.”

(4/18/18 Tr., p.26, Ls.15-19.)

Nowhere

during his suppression hearing testimony did the Trooper say he was not going t0 follow up 0n the
trafﬁc Violation he observed.

T0

the contrary, the ofﬁcer’s investigation 0f Jay’s wellbeing

part 0f the ofﬁcer’s investigation of the trafﬁc Violation.

Jay’s wellbeing

mean that the

The

fact that the ofﬁcer’s

became heightened once Jay failed t0 respond to attempts

overall investigation into the trafﬁc Violation

11

t0

was abandoned.

was

concern over

awaken him does not

Based on the testimony presented, the magistrate court explained

that the ofﬁcer

had

probable cause to believe Jay committed a trafﬁc Violation, Which, considering Jay’s nonresponsiveness, entitled the ofﬁcer t0 open the car door under Irwin:
Additionally, Trooper Rodean was investigating a traﬁc violation, for
which he had probable cause. An ofﬁcer is not per se prohibited from opening a
vehicle’s door, especially When the ofﬁcer has probable cause of criminal activity.
Nonetheless, in this case, the opening 0f the door was not unreasonable and was a
minimal intrusion by Trooper Rodean given the totality 0f the circumstances.

(R.,

p.72 (citing Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 137 P.3d 1024).)

The

district court

explained that Trooper Rodean testiﬁed that he told dispatch that he was

stopping t0 see if a motorist needed assistance “because people

park on the shoulder of the interstate unless their car
explanation[,]

.

.

is

know

they are not supposed t0

broken down 0r there

is

some

other

.

But I don

was

purpose 0r that he ignored
thefact that the car was illegally parked, which was obviousfrom the statute and
the video. So I don’t know that the ofﬁcer had to testify to that since it is so obvious
from the Video that the magistrate judge could have made that factual ﬁnding.
’t

think he testiﬁed that

his only

397)

and he says, “I am doing this
motorist assist t0 see ﬁrst if someone just is having a problem that I can assist with
versus writing him up for the clear trafﬁc Violation of parking on the interstate.”[3]

So he

is

(4/22/19 Tr., p.21, L.20

that

checking out and he

—

calls dispatch

p.23, L.1 (emphasis added).)

As

the district court concluded, the fact

Trooper Rodean decided t0 ﬁrst investigate Whether the driver of the vehicle was “having a

problem,” does not show he abandoned the possibility of “writing him up for the clear trafﬁc

3

It

appears that the end quote in this sentence should be placed t0 have the sentence read:

and he says, “I am doing this
motorist assist t0 see ﬁrst if someone is having a problem that I can assist with”
versus writing him up for the clear trafﬁc Violation 0f parking 0n the interstate.

So he

is

checking out and he

calls dispatch
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Violation of parking

on the

interstate.”

Prior to opening Jay’s car door, the ofﬁcer had

(Id.)

reasonable suspicion (and even probable cause) t0 detain Jay for the trafﬁc Violation.

had responded

awaken him,

t0 the Trooper’s initial attempt t0

entitled to detain

him

in order t0 identify

and

(if

he chose)

the ofﬁcer

cite

.

.

.

would have been

if Jay

legally

him — Jay could not have,

suggests, just driven away. (See Appellant’s Brief, p.28 (“Once Trooper

Jay was possibly moving

Even

Rodean noticed

as he

that

he should have provided Mr. Jay an opportunity to drive away

.

.

Mr.

.

or

voluntar[ily] initiate contact with Trooper Rodean.”)

Based 0n the record before the magistrate

was no evidence showing
Violation.

that

court, the district court correctly

concluded there

Trooper Rodean abandoned his investigation of the parking

Although the Trooper became focused 0n whether the parking Violation was due

having a physical problem, the ofﬁcer never

10st sight

to

Jay

0f the fact that Jay was illegally parked 0n

Interstate 84.

3.

Irwin

Is

Dispositive

Jay has failed t0 show that
the state failed t0

Of This Appeal

m

does not apply t0 his case based 0n his arguments that (1)

show Trooper Rodean had reasonable suspicion that

access highway under I.C. § 49-660(1)(a)(9), and (2) he

abandoned his investigation
is

into Jay’s trafﬁc Violation.

Interstate

(R., p.72;

4/22/19

162 P.3d 776, 780

(Ct.

t0 order occupants out

Tr., p.26,

L.23 — p.28, L.18); see State

V.

would have been within

Metzger out of the vehicle, as he would

later do,

by opening

m

the car

Metzger, 144 Idaho 397, 401,

in Irwin that, Within their

0f a vehicle during a legitimate trafﬁc stop, an ofﬁcer
this case

a controlled-

Both lower courts correctly held that

App. 2007) (“[G]iven our recent analysis

door himself; the deputy in

is

was not seized because Trooper Rodean

dispositive 0f Jay’s assertion that the ofﬁcer illegally searched his vehicle

door.

84

power

may open the vehicle

his discretion t0 not only order

but t0 open the door himself t0 enable her exit”).
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The Ofﬁcer Opened The Car Door As

D.

A Valid Community Caretaking Function

The community caretaking ﬁmction involves

the duty of the police to help individuals that

ofﬁcers believe are in need 0f immediate assistance.

State V.

Wixom, 130 Idaho

752, 754, 947

P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (citing In re Claﬂon, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401 (1988)). “In analyzing

community caretaking function
test.”

I_d.

“The

cases, Idaho courts

constitutional standard in

was reasonable

action of police

in

have adopted a

totality

of the circumstances

community caretaking function cases is Whether intrusive

View 0f all surrounding circumstances.”

m,

754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State V. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867, 893 P.2d 81

1,

130 Idaho

814

(Ct.

at

App.

1995)) (brackets omitted).

The

state

argued in the magistrate court that, as a legitimate community caretaking function

0f law enforcement, Trooper Rodean was entitled t0 open the door 0f the car
the Interstate because Jay

two attempts
T11, p.24,

awaken him by knocking 0n

t0

L22 — p.25,

theor[y] of the

was slumped back in the

L.4.)

community

that theory,

parked on

and did not respond to the ofﬁcer’s

window.

(R., pp.41, 43-45; 4/ 1 8/ 18

Although the magistrate court opted not

t0 “analyze the alternative

the driver’s side

care taking function” 0f law enforcement (R., p.73, n3), the district

court held that the suppression hearing testimony

0n

driver’s seat

illegally

was sufﬁcient

t0 validate the ofﬁcer’s

conduct

and explained:

When

few things that you can
conﬁdant were noted by the magistrate judge in his
factual ﬁndings as well. The magistrate judge noted that Trooper Rodine [sic]
called in his location, approached the driver’s side door Where he observed the
defendant in the driver’s seat, slumped back apparently sleeping. The car was off,
the hazard lights were not ﬂashing, and the trooper did not see any movement by
the ofﬁcer approaches the door there are a

note from the Video that

I

am

the driver.

G0

t0

Page 15

in the transcript, Line 8:

appeared to be sleeping in the front
in the seat.”

seat.

That answer by the ofﬁcer

“There was a gentlemen,

[sic]

Eyes were closed, leaned back, slumped
is

ﬁndings.
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consistent With the magistrate judge’s

The ofﬁcer then continues that he knocked 0n the window, tries twice trying
t0 get his attention and a response. He saw n0 response and that is When he knocked
a second time and he waited a few seconds and then he tried to open the door.
The ofﬁcer’s testimony is

that

he didn’t see movement. Iwatched the Video

very closely and it’s possible, possible that there is a slight movement, but
difﬁcult t0 see because the tinting 0n that rearview window is so dark.

it is

very

what is seen on the dash cam has not been shown t0 be seen
The ofﬁcer testiﬁed that 0n the side of a very busy interstate that is,

Additionally,

by

the ofﬁcer.

obviously in watching the Video, very, very noisy, that he may have been looking a
different direction that you can’t see 0n the dash cam because he testiﬁed he did
not see any movement.

So

ﬁnd

that testimony by the ofﬁcer t0 be competent and consistent With
judge’s
the magistrate
ﬁnding that the ofﬁcer did not see any movement and that is
I

why he took the further step of attempting t0 open the door. The door was unlocked
and the ofﬁcer was able t0 open the door. This was at approximately ﬁve seconds,
as found by the magistrate, and consistent With the Court’s own review 0f the Video
when the door was opened.

So even under the defendant’s theory of this case, the noisy interstate I84,
no response t0 the knocking, waiting ﬁve seconds, the trooper testifying that he did
not see movement, authorizes him to try to open the door t0 see if the person needs
medical assistance.

This

a caretaking function.

is

And

While not speciﬁcally

addressed by the magistrate judge, it is consistent with the ﬁndings in the -- 0r the
ofﬁcer’s testimony and in the argument based on the fact that he said that was his
initial

there

reason

why he

was a motorist

stopped,

is

t0 see if the motorist

in the vehicle.

So

needed assistance 0r even if
ﬁmction is similar t0 an

this caretaking

exigent circumstance.

And

While

I

realize the defense argued in their reply brief that the exigent

circumstance exception

is

a

new argument by

disagrees as any time an ofﬁcer
that

exception

circumstance.

comes
It is

is

the State, the Court respectfully

checking 0n the well being of another individual,

play whether it’s called caretaking or exigent
the same situation, that you’re worried about a person’s well
into

being and so you proceed if [sic]
check on the person’s well being.

it

was a

search, a warrantless search, t0 merely

Additionally, the Court ﬁnds that this

is

a minimal intrusion.

It is --

the

ofﬁcer did not seek contraband. He was not motivated by an unlawful purpose. He
was motivated t0 check 0n the driver’s well being. And it is unlike the case cited
by the defense regarding South Carolina Where When the ofﬁcer opened the door
he clearly saw contraband.
In this case the ofﬁcer opens the door, he can barely hear the defendant, and

he
is

is

simply trying t0 explain to him that you cannot park here and inquire

there and if he needs assistance.
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Why he

So

minimal intrusion justiﬁed by the caretaking requirements 0f a
law enforcement ofﬁcer and is an alternative basis under the facts found by the
magistrate judge t0 support that the opening of the car door, even if it was a search
0r a seizure, was allowed under the law as a minimal intrusion, as a
this is a

caretaking/exigent circumstance in that

ﬁnd evidence

(4/22/19 Tr., p.23, L.2

The

certainly

was not motivated by

trying to

— p.26, L22.)

analysis of the district court

physical or mechanical problem Jay

on the

it

to use against the defendant.

side 0f Interstate 84.

It

is

compelling. Trooper

Rodean had no idea what,

if any,

may have been experiencing that caused him t0 park illegally

would have been

careless 0f Trooper

Rodean

to not take the next

reasonable step (after knocking 0n the window) to try t0 awaken Jay as he sat slumped in the
driver’s seat

0n the side 0f Interstate

84.

By opening the car door to awaken Jay by talking t0 him

and/or letting the fresh air and trafﬁc noise

and

(potentially)

other motorists.

community caretaking function
safety.

From

stir

him, the ofﬁcer was attempting to safeguard Jay

Trooper Rodean’s conduct exempliﬁes the legitimate

entrusted to law enforcement ofﬁcers for ensuring the public’s

the Trooper’s perspective at the time, Jay’s illegal parking and non-responsiveness

could have been due t0 a medical emergency.

Under those circumstances, the ofﬁcer acted

reasonably and responsibly by opening the car door t0
mentally, alright.

The

district court’s legal conclusions,

the magistrate court, should be

Jay argues

that,

afﬁrmed 0n

However, the

out if Jay

was

physically, or even

supported by the evidence presented in

that basis.

because the magistrate court did not make a ruling on the

“community caretaking” argument, the
p.28.)

ﬁnd

factual

district court

was not

entitled to

do

state’s

so. (Appellant’s Brief,

and legal bases for that exception t0 the warrant requirement was

fully

presented to the magistrate court, Which simply chose not t0 analyze the issue. Because the record

was well-developed

in the magistrate court, there is

the district court’s analysis and ruling

no reason

this

Court cannot consider whether

0n the community caretaking issue
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is

supported by that

See State

record.

V. Bradstreet,

court in

its

DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 71

V.

1,

184 P.3d 215, 217

145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)) (“

App. 2008)

Losser

On review ofa decision rendered by a district

This Court should therefore afﬁrm the district court’s determination that

Trooper Rodean’s act 0f opening the door 0f the car Jay was

community caretaking function of a law enforcement

The Clarke Decision Does Not

sitting in

was justiﬁed

Invalidate Jay’s Arrest

argument 0n the recent decision in State
held that Article

I,

as a valid

ofﬁcer.

Jay challenges, for the ﬁrst time on appeal, the constitutionality 0f his

arrest for

(citing

intermediate appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly revieW[s] the district

court’s decision”).

E.

(Ct.

V.

arrest.

Jay bases his

Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 446 P.3d 451 (2019), which

Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution

is

violated

When an ofﬁcer makes any

any misdemeanor offense occurring outside the ofﬁcer’s presence. However, because

Jay did not challenge the constitutionality 0f his arrest below, he has failed t0 preserve that issue

on appeal. See

State V. Martin, 119 Idaho 577,

to raise [a] constitutional

it

for the ﬁrst time

argument before the

on appeal”);

ﬂ

808 P.2d 1322

(Ct.

App. 1991) (appellant “failed

district court, and, accordingly,

also State V. Cortez, 122 Idaho 439,

he cannot

835 P.2d 674

now raise
(Ct.

App.

1992); State V. Samora, 131 Idaho 198, 199, 953 P.2d 638, 639 (Ct. App. 1998).
In order to raise such a claim for the ﬁrst time

“constitute[d] fundamental error.”

App. 2014)); State
Jay has not done
their

V.

so.

on appeal, Jay would need

show

to

State V. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 792, 331 P.3d 529,

Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1022-23, 842 P.2d 698, 701-02

(Ct.

that

534

it

(Ct.

App. 1992).

(See generally Appellant’s Brief.) Because appellants must raise issues in

opening brieﬁng t0 preserve issues for appeal, Patterson

151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718, 729 (201
constitutionality of Jay’s arrest has

1),

V. State,

Dep’t 0f Health

& Welfare,

any claim 0f fundamental error challenging the

been waived on appeal.
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Even
privileges

Court concludes that Jay’s arrest for the misdemeanor 0f driving Without

if this

would have been

under the more recent decision 0f

illegal

evidence would not be warranted under the attenuation doctrine.
suppress evidence as

‘fruit

been recovered as a

result

of the poisonous

tree,’ the

court

of the exploitation 0f that

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”

A

454, 459 (2004) (citation omitted).

M,

suppression 0f the

“To determine whether

to

must inquire whether the evidence has

illegality or instead

by means sufﬁciently

State V. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d

court considers three factors

“when determining whether

unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated”: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct

and the acquisition of the evidence,

0f intervening circumstances, and

(2) the occurrence

ﬂagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.”
(7th Cir.

111 F.3d 515, 521

Under

1997),

which

the ﬁrst factor, there

Jay, the discovery

cited

Brown V.

I_d.

“where a lawful

arrest

— p.36,

L.8.)

However,

due to an outstanding warrant

consent (or any act for that matter) by the defendant

is

is arrest

involving consent or confessions.

showed he had an outstanding
as explained in

is

is

irrelevant.”

If anything, the short length

I_d.

“Thus,” Where the

is less ‘taint’

than” in cases

of time between any

detention and the discovery 0f a warrant weighs in favor of attenuation in this case.

at 846,

103 P.3d

at

459 (“there was a minimal lapse

0f the license and the search pursuant t0 a valid

arrest warrant”).

18

111 F.3d

the intervening circumstance,

0n an outstanding warrant, “there
Li.

m,

not required.” Li. Thus, “[a]ny inﬂuence

would have 0n the defendant’s conduct

intervening circumstance

Egg, 140 Idaho

Green,

of his true identity by ﬁnding his Idaho ID card in his wallet upon being

felony warrant. (4/18/18 Tr., p.33, Ls.23

the unlawful stop

V.

lapse 0f time between the arrest of

searched, and the resultant “driving return” from dispatch that

at 522,

United States

422 U.S. 590, 603-604 (1975)).

Illinois,

was admittedly a minimal

(citing

(3) the

in time

illegal

Compare

between the seizure

Second, the discovery of the outstanding felony warrant constituted a clear intervening
In

event.

m,

111 F.3d 515, 517, ofﬁcers followed a car based on a belief that one of

occupants was a fugitive 0r that one of the occupants might

The ofﬁcers stopped behind
walking toward the house.

the car after the car pulled into a driveway and the driver

Li.

One 0f the ofﬁcers

the driver, yelled that he needed to speak With

provided identiﬁcation.
passenger,

Who was

still

know the whereabouts 0f the

in the car,

fugitive.

was already

“exited the police car and, While approaching

him

for a second.”

I_d.

“In the meantime,” the second ofﬁcer

Li.

its

and requested his identiﬁcation.

I_d.

Upon

request, the driver

made

contact with the

“The ofﬁcers returned

t0

the squad car and entered the information in their computer to determine the validity of the drivers’

licenses, as well as to

check for outstanding warrants.” Li “Within ﬁve minutes the computer

revealed an outstanding warrant for [the passenger],” and the ofﬁcers arrested him.

The

Li.

ofﬁcers searched the car and discovered crack cocaine and a gun, after which the driver was also
arrested.

I_d.

Green argued he was

entitled t0 suppression

of the evidence, claiming the detention was

unlawful once the ofﬁcers recognized neither 0f the car’s occupants were the fugitive they were
looking

for,

and

Amendment.

m,

was

illegal”

instance

check violated the Fourth

that the continued detention to run a warrants

111 F.3d at 518. Although the Seventh Circuit found the “stop in the ﬁrst

because

it

was unsupported by reasonable

articulable suspicion,

it

held the

lawful arrest of the passenger 0n an outstanding warrant “constituted an intervening circumstance
sufﬁcient t0 dissipate any taint caused
this conclusion, the

correctly noted that:

came from

by the

illegal

automobile stop.”

Li. at 5

1

9,

52 1. In reaching

Seventh Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s three-factor attenuation
“In the ﬁnal analysis, however, the question

‘the exploitation

of that

illegality or instead

19

is still

test

but

whether the evidence

by means sufﬁciently distinguishable

t0

be

purged of the primary
United

taint.”’

Li. at

521 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. 590, and quoting

371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).

States,

dissipates the taint involves a voluntary act

by

Wong Sun V.

“Typically, the intervening circumstance

Which

the defendant, such as the voluntary confession or

consent t0 search given after an illegal search or seizure.” Green, 111 F.3d at 522. Stated another

way, the

taint is dissipated

once there

of the actual discovery 0f evidence
once the warrant

is

discovered.

is

a voluntary act

0r, in the

EQ

by

the defendant regardless of the timing

case 0f an outstanding warrant, the taint

is

dissipated

In short, the discovery of the outstanding felony warrant

against Jay weighs heavily in the state’s favor in regard t0 the three-part test for attenuation.

As to the ﬂagrancy and purpose 0f the improper law enforcement action, Trooper Rodean’s
arrest

of Jay for driving without privileges was completely legal under the law in effect

— before Clarke was

issued.

names

time

Trooper Rodean arrested Jay not only because he admitted that he did

not have a driver’s license (4/18/18 TL, p.33, L.23
the ofﬁcer ﬁctitious

at the

— p.34,

L.16), but also because he twice gave

prior t0 his arrest (4/18/18 Tr., p.27, L.5

—

p.34, L.13).

The Trooper

testiﬁed that he placed Jay under arrest “because [he] could not identify him and [they] were going

to

be going

to jail until [he] could identify

him.” (4/18/18

Tr., p.33, Ls.2-9.)

there another basis for the arrest?” the ofﬁcer explained that,

when he was

When asked “[W]as

trying t0 identify

Jay was, “[Jay] had admitted t0 [him] that he did not have a valid driver’s license.” (4/18/18
p.33, L.23

to Idaho

— p.34,

Code

§

L.9.)

Based on those

factors,

Trooper Rodean was entitled t0

arrest

Tr.,

Jay pursuant

49-14070), which reads:

When

peace ofﬁcer has option t0 take person before a magistrate. -Whenever any person is halted by a peace ofﬁcer for any misdemeanor Violation 0f
the provisions of this title and is not required to be taken before a magistrate, the
person shall, in the discretion of the ofﬁcer, either be given a trafﬁc citation or be
taken without unnecessary delay before the proper magistrate as speciﬁed in section
49- 141 1, Idaho Code, in the following cases:

20

who

(1)

When the person does not furnish satisfactory evidence

of identity 0r when the

ofﬁcer has reasonable and probable grounds t0 believe the person Will disregard a
written promise to appear in court.

(Emphasis added.)

Under

the law in effect at the time, Jay’s arrest for driving Without privileges

was

valid

pursuant to LC. § 49-1407(1) because Jay did not “furnish satisfactory evidence of identity” and,
as a separate basis, the ofﬁcer

had “reasonable and probable grounds

to believe [Jay

would]

disregard a written promise to appear in court.”4 Trooper Rodean’s conduct could not have been

ﬂagrant because he was merely following the law that existed
In short,

all

three 0f the attenuation factors

Trooper Rodean’s misdemeanor
or attenuated

by

0f Jay was

the discovery that Jay

paraphernalia that
that warrant

arrest

weigh

illegal

at the time.

in favor

under Clarke, such

that,

illegality

assuming

was purged

had an outstanding felony warrant. Therefore, the drug

was found during the inventory search of the

was not

0f a ﬁnding

car Jay following the discovery of

subject t0 the exclusionary rule.

For the above reasons, Jay has failed

to

show

that his arrest

was

illegal

under Clarke.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

order denying Jay’s

suppression motion.

DATED this

16th day of January, 2020.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

4

It

should be recalled that Jay’s arrest led to Trooper Rodean’s discovery 0f Jay’s wallet 0n his

person, and his true identity, Which, in turn, resulted in the discovery that Jay had an outstanding

felony arrest warrant. (4/18/18 T11, p.33, L.2

— p.36,
21

L.8.)
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